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Abstract 
Ireland is rare among advanced economies in not having statutory trade union recognition 
legislation for collective bargaining purposes. The matter has been a source of policy 
contention over the years with attempts to resolve it encapsulated in the so-called ‘Right to 
Bargain’ legislation, introduced in 2001. This legislation has sought to circumvent statutory 
recognition in Ireland by putting in place an alternative mechanism for unions to represent 
members in non-union firms where collective bargaining is not practiced. This review, based 
on a mixture of empirical and documentary evidence, demonstrates that IRAA 2001-4 was 
moderately successful for a short period in generating pay rises, improved employment 
conditions and better access to procedures for union members in non-unionised firms. Indeed, 
in some respects, it was a superior institutional mechanism to a statutory recognition regime.  
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1. Introduction 
In liberal-market economies (LMEs), formal recognition of unions by employers is widely 
seen as a central building block of trade unionism1. Yet Ireland remains an exception among 
developed economies, including other LMEs like the UK, in not having statutory union 
recognition legislation for collective bargaining purposes. The common assumption is that 
while Article 40 of the 1937 Constitution of Ireland guarantees the right of citizens to form 
associations and unions, this constitutional guarantee of freedom of association does not 
mean that employers can be compelled to recognise unions. To circumvent the Constitutional 
conundrum, and for other contextual reasons discussed below, Irish policy-makers crafted a 
particularist solution in the form of the so-called ‘Right to Bargain’ legislation known as the 
Industrial Relations (Amendment) Act 2001 (with a subsequent ‘Miscellaneous Provisions’ 
amendment in 2004)(henceforth known as IRAA 2001-4). This law does not provide for 
statutory trade union recognition for collective bargaining purposes as in other jurisdictions 
like the US, Canada or UK. Rather it provides a dispute resolution procedure for unionised 
employees to access union representation on claims for improvements in pay, conditions of 
employment or procedures in non-union firms where collective bargaining does not exist.  
 
      More than ten years on from the introduction of IRAA 2001-4, a full review and 
assessment is timely. Through preliminary analysis of 56 cases involving the Labour Court, 
followed by a more detailed case study analysis of 15 specific disputes arising under the 
legislation, the efficacy of these provisions are assessed. Contrary to previous sceptical 
evaluations2, this article argues that, prior to a 2007 Supreme Court judgment (on a legal 
challenge to IRAA 2001-4 brought by the non-union airline Ryanair), the legislation 
                                                     
1 G.Gall,‘The first ten years of the third statutory union recognition procedure in the Britain’, [2010] 39 Industrial Law 
Journal, 444 
2 D’Art, D. and T. Turner, ‘Union recognition in Ireland: one step forward or two steps back?’, [2003] 34 Industrial 
Relations Journal, 226; D’Art and T. Turner, ‘Union recognition and partnership at work: a new legitimacy for Irish trade 
unions?’, [2005] 36 Industrial Relations Journal, 121 
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delivered partial benefits for unions and their members. However, the Supreme Court 
judgment exposed significant loopholes in the existing legislation which employers have 
exploited to their advantage. Since 2007 IRAA 2001-4 and the problem of collective 
bargaining rights in non-union firms has remained in limbo. The current coalition 
government that came to power in 2011 has promised to resolve the present deadlock. At 
time of writing it is yet to do so, although it is expected that the cabinet will table an initiative 
in 2014 to address this matter3. 
 
      In examining these issues, the article is arranged as follows: Section 2 outlines the 
antecedents, content and principles of IRAA 2001-4, in particular demonstrating how the 
legislation dovetailed with the institutional peculiarities of Irish industrial relations. 
Subsequently, Section 3 describes the research methods. Section 4 and 5 detail the procedures 
in operation, with emphasis on the particular benefits and constraints faced by Irish unions in 
pursuing their goals under the legislation. Section 6 discusses the findings, offering 
concluding observations on the matter of union representation and recognition in non-union 
firms in Ireland. 
 
2. IRAA 2001-4: antecedents, content and principles 
Collective bargaining rights and trade union recognition have been a contentious issue in 
Irish industrial relations for some time4. Historically union recognition was addressed 
through the milieu of pluralist liberal-collectivism, with recognition a purely voluntarist 
matter. Where an employer rejected union recognition, union members would either mobilise 
power and resort to strikes or refer disputes to the Labour Court under Section 20 of the 
                                                     
3 B.Sheehan,‘Collective bargaining legislation to breathe new life into 2001 Act?’, Industrial Relations News (Dublin, 2013, 
44) 
4 C. McCarthy, Trade Unions in Ireland 1894-1960 (Institute of Public Administration 1977) 
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Industrial Relations Act 1969 (IRA 1969) and, much less frequently, the Industrial Relations 
Act 1990 (IRA 1990). However if the Court found in favour of recognition, which it routinely 
did, the employer was under no legal obligation to consent. Studies suggest that from the 
1980s onwards, there was a growing tendency for employers to simply flout Court 
recommendations on this matter5. This proved progressively challenging for unions, 
especially as their power resources at local-level waned over time and the decline in unions’ 
industrial strength dispossessed them of sufficient bargaining power to put recognition claims 
into effect. The 1980s and 1990s saw the organisational base of private sector unions steadily 
corrode, first through the impact of high unemployment, but more substantively, through 
structural changes in the economy. New fields of employment proved inhospitable for union 
growth6. Since the 1980s, non-union multinational companies, particularly of US ownership, 
have been relatively successful in instigating union-free industrial relations. The policy stance 
of government and its industrial development agencies also shifted from encouraging firms to 
recognise unions to one of being accommodative to non-union multinationals7. Concurrently 
unions faced mounting opposition to unionisation among indigenous employers8. The 
important Nolan Transport case of 1994, resulting in a High Court order for one union to pay 
£1.3 million in damages for irregularities in industrial action for recognition, stands as a 
tribute to a section of Irish employers’ determination to remain union free (the decision was, 
however, later overturned by the Supreme Court). This emerging trajectory towards union 
                                                     
5 P. Gunnigle, M. O’Sullivan and M. Kinsella, ‘Organised labour in the new economy: trade unions and public policy in the 
Republic of Ireland’ in D. D’Art and T. Turner (eds), Irish Employment Relations in the New Economy (Blackhall Publishing 
2002) 
6 W.K. Roche,‘The trend of unionisation in Ireland since the mid-1990s’ in T. Hastings (ed), The State of the Unions, (Liffey 
Press, 2008). 
7 D.G. Collings, P. Gunnigle and M.J. Morley, ‘Between Boston and Berlin, American MNCs and the shifting contours of 
industrial relations in Ireland’, [2008] 19 International Journal of Human Resource Management, 242 
8 M. O’Sullivan and P. Gunnigle, ‘Bearing all the hallmarks of oppression: Union avoidance in Europe’s largest low-cost 
airline’, [2009] 34 Labor Studies Journal, 251 
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avoidance was of course not confined to Ireland and broadly mirrored trends of a growing 
anti-unionism elsewhere9.  
 
      How did Irish unions respond to such trends? During the late 1990s pressure arose from 
Irish unions for government action on the recognition problem. Although unions had raised 
the recognition matter under the Irish ‘social partnership’ framework as early as 1990, it was 
in 1997 that a tri-partite working group was constituted to examine the issue: the ‘High-Level 
Group on Trade Union Recognition’. The Group’s report, issued in 1997, called for the 
safeguarding of voluntarism, albeit with a procedural ‘long march’ through the state dispute 
resolution institutions, namely the Labour Relations Commission (LRC) and the Labour 
Court. Unions were critical of the report; a mood further aggravated by a high-profile 
recognition dispute in the airline Ryanair in 1998. This dispute, which shut down Dublin 
Airport, captured the limitations of voluntarism in the face of unyielding employer resistance. 
Consequently the issue was re-visited by the working group, although in the interim period, 
the union’s thinking evolved into a willingness to reconsider demands for full-blooded 
recognition and instead pursue a form of professional representation. This new position also 
echoed Supreme Court sentiments, arising from the Nolan Transport case, that “employers 
have an obligation to accord trade unions a measure of respect; representing as they do the 
rights of the workers”10. Influenced by the Irish Labour Party, the Irish Congress of Trade 
Unions (ICTU) conceived a procedure for dispute resolution that would permit unions to 
provide a representative service to members in non-unionised firms where collective 
bargaining was not practiced. The ICTU proposed that mandatory arbitration by the Labour 
                                                     
9 J. Murray, ‘Work choices and the radical revision of the public realm of Australian statutory labour law’, [2006] 35 
Industrial Law Journal, 343; E. Heery and M. Simms, M. ‘Seizing an opportunity? Union organising campaigns in Britain. 
1998-2004’, [2011] 37 Labor History, 23; K. Moody, ‘Beating the union: union avoidance in the US’ in G. Gall and T. 
Dundon (eds) Global Anti-Unionism (Palgrave Macmillan 2013) 
10 Nolan Transport v Halligan Ltd and Others, [1998] ELR 177 
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Court would only arise in disputes where terms and conditions were out of line with industry 
norms and where employers refused to engage with union representatives. In effect, a 
replication of the sectoral Joint Labour Committee system was proposed. It was predicted that 
an incentive for employers to bargain would arise from the potential for arbitration decisions 
by the Labour Court to have the same status as employment regulation orders. The intention 
was that the very presence of a statutory procedure for unilateral arbitration by the Labour 
Court would facilitate a legislatively prompted, but voluntarist, settlement of disputes. 
 
      The above formula underpinned the final ‘Report of the High Level Group on Trade 
Union Recognition’ in 1999, which proposed a two-stage approach to settling union 
representation disputes over improvements in pay, conditions of employment or procedures 
where collective bargaining was absent. The resultant 2001 legislation, eventually agreed by 
a centre-right government, ICTU and the Irish Business and Employers’ Confederation 
(IBEC), was IRAA 2001-4. The first stage was a ‘voluntary procedure’, covered under a 
Code of Practice on Voluntary Dispute Resolution, that is, Statutory Instrument (SI) No 145 
of 2000. The purpose of this procedure, under which both employers and unions could avail 
of the LRC’s advisory service, was to secure consensual agreement on disputed issues. The 
second, compulsory or ‘fall-back’ component, was triggered if employers refused to engage 
with the voluntary procedure. This measure provided for a full Labour Court hearing, 
resulting at first in a non-binding recommendation. If this initial recommendation failed to 
resolve the dispute, unions could apply to the Labour Court for a binding ‘determination’. If 
the employer refused to accept a determination, the union could have it legally enforced by 
the Circuit Court. Crucially the Act and the associated Code of Practice did not provide for 
union recognition. Rather it was a mechanism designed to address collective disputes in 
workplaces without collective bargaining. The Act did not preclude the fact that parties might 
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voluntarily reach a union recognition agreement, but its remit did not encompass 
recommendations on recognition per se.  
 
      The IRAA 2001 was later amended in 2004 due to union dissatisfaction with timescales 
across the voluntary and compulsory stages. The main change in the Industrial Relations 
(Amendment) Act (Miscellaneous Provisions) 2004 was a tweaked Code of Practice on 
Voluntary Dispute Resolution, SI No 176 of 2004, which substantially shortened timescales 
to 26 weeks, up to a maximum of 34 weeks where necessary, from time of referral to point of 
issuance of a binding determination by the Labour Court. The 2004 amendment allowed 
unions to refer cases to the Labour Court after six weeks at the voluntary stage involving the 
LRC. The first Court hearing could then be held between four to six weeks after this, with a 
voluntary recommendation issued within three weeks. A union then had four weeks to seek a 
binding determination, ultimately enforceable in the Circuit Court. Under the 2004 
amendment, a union could also process cases directly to the Labour Court if LRC timelines 
were breached or the LRC saw no realistic prospect of progress.  
 
      Of note is that public policy attempts to tackle the recognition problem in Ireland 
coincided with a comparable effort in the UK at broadly the same time. The comparative 
aspects are worth briefly considering. To short-circuit their growing industrial weakness, UK 
unions successfully campaigned in the political arena for state supported provisions to prompt 
employers to negotiate with them11. Yet, in contrast to Ireland, the UK opted for an explicit 
union recognition procedure, a system it had previously experimented with in the 1970s12. 
                                                     
11 W. Wedderburn, ‘Collective bargaining or legal enactment: the 1999 Act and union recognition’, [2000] 29 Industrial Law 
Journal, 1; W. Brown, S. Deakin, M. Hudson and C. Pratten, ‘The limits of statutory trade union recognition’, [2001] 32 
Industrial Relations Journal, 180 
12 S.Wood and J. Godard, ‘The statutory union recognition procedure in the employment relations bill: a comparative 
analysis’, [1999] 37 British Journal of Industrial Relations, 203 
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The two policy approaches are thus distinct, insofar as one sought to resolve collective 
disputes in the absence of collective bargaining (Ireland), the other to enable union 
recognition where there was sufficient demand for it (UK). However both sought to 
encourage what Gall13 terms ‘legally induced voluntarism’ at local-level with statutory 
imposed solutions as a last resort. Beyond this, the UK approach was quite different. It ruled 
out a stratum of non-union firms by excluding those with less than 21 employees (nearly a 
third of the UK workforce). Where no voluntary agreement was forthcoming, unions could 
apply to the Central Arbitration Committee (CAC) for statutory support provided they held 
10 per cent membership in a designated ‘bargaining unit’ and proved that a majority favoured 
recognition. Automatic recognition could be awarded based on majority membership, 
although the CAC could order a ballot in the interest of ‘good industrial relations’ for 
example. Not only would a majority vote for recognition be required, but at least 40 per cent 
of those entitled to vote would need to participate. Under the statutory route, UK unions 
could be recognised only for collective bargaining over pay, hours and holidays. In contrast, 
Irish unions, in pursuing claims, faced no specified thresholds in terms of number of 
employees needed14. There were no restrictions on firm size and unions were enabled to 
secure statutory support on claims over a broad palette of collective issues aside from union 
recognition. 
 
      In eschewing the UK route, the policy approach adopted in Ireland must be understood 
within the context of the country’s broader institutional environment. First, there was (and is) 
a widely held consensus that attempts to introduce UK-style recognition legislation would 
encounter a constitutional obstacle. In Article 40.6.1.iii of the Constitution, the State 
                                                     
13 G. Gall,‘Union recognition in Britain: the end of legally-induced voluntarism’, [2012] 41 Industrial Law Journal, 47 
14 The original bill set a threshold for unions to show they were adequately representative of the workforce in a particular 
employment. This was in line with the judgement in Federation of Irish Rail and Road Workers v. Great Southern Railway 
(1942) which set a criterion that a union with more than one-third of the workforce was representative for statutory purposes. 
The final version of the Act had no requirement for membership thresholds however due to union pressure. 
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guarantees liberty for the exercise of the right of citizens to form associations or unions. This 
amounts to an effective constitutional guarantee of freedom of association. However, the 
Courts do not appear to accept that the constitutional guarantee of free association includes a 
right to have one’s trade union recognised by one’s employer for collective bargaining and 
have held that there is no duty placed on an employer to negotiate with any particular body of 
citizens. Thus the Irish Constitution appears to prohibit the possibility for statutory 
recognition insofar as it involves the conflict of two constitutional rights related to freedom of 
association: the right of workers to be in a trade union and the right of employers not to 
recognise a union15. In an important High Court judgment from 1982, it was concluded: 
“…the suggestion in the pleading that there is a constitutional right to be represented 
by a union in the conduct of negotiations with employers…could not be sustained. 
There is no constitutional duty placed on any employer to negotiate with any 
particular citizen or body of citizens.” 16   
 
      Secondly, all Irish industrial relations actors had their own reasons to be wary of statutory 
recognition. Elements of the union leadership were divided on the merits of a statutory 
regime. Irish unions, like their British counterparts, have historically displayed some 
antipathy to judiciary involvement in industrial relations17, and have remained cautious about 
moving to greater legalism. In part, the spectre of potential de-recognition has been 
prominent in their thinking. There was a pragmatic acceptance that IRAA 2001-4, whilst not 
providing for recognition, potentially compelled firms to implement Labour Court decisions 
on pay and conditions, making joining a union in such circumstances meaningful for workers. 
                                                     
15 A. Kerr, ‘Collective labour law’ in T.V. Murphy and W.K. Roche (eds), Irish Industrial Relations in Practice (Oak Tree 
Press 1997); G. Hogan and G. Whyte, Kelly: The Irish Constitution (Butterworth 2003) 
16 Abbott & Whelan v ITGWU & Southern Health Board [1982] 1 JISLL 56. Not all Irish labour law experts accept this 
assumption. It has been claimed that the conventional view that there is constitutional barrier to union recognition is a 
misunderstanding of the Abbott & Whelan High Court judgment. This judgment, it has been argued, implies that there is no 
constitutional right to compel employers to recognise unions. This, however, does nothing to stop the State introducing 
future legislation for union recognition. Indeed statutory rights to negotiate have been implemented in relation to collective 
redundancies and transfer of undertakings as required by European Directives. See C. Higgins, ‘2001/2004 Acts clash throws 
up unlikely bedfellows’ Industrial Relations News (Dublin 2006, 11) 
17 McCarthy, above n.4.; O. Kahn-Freund, Labour Relations: Heritage and Adjustment (Oxford University Press 1979) 
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It was also hoped that the procedures might indirectly encourage recognition under the 
shadow of the IRAA 2001-4, perhaps in the form of pre-emptive voluntary recognition 
agreements18. Although neither government nor employers had any desire to alter the status 
quo, this concession was offered to unions in the then context of securing a new national 
wage agreement under the tri-partite social partnership model. Standard thinking among 
employers, politicians and the general commentariat was that for the government to have 
conceded statutory recognition would have risked the danger of foreign multinationals 
viewing Ireland less positively as an investment site19. For the government, there was basic 
satisfaction that voluntarism had been preserved, but also that multinationals, especially of 
American origin, were essentially cushioned from the remit of the legislation. For IBEC, 
primarily representative of large employers, the compromise appeared something that it could 
live with. Many of its principal members, including those in the foreign-owned non-union 
sector, were unlikely to become embroiled in union recognition disputes in the first place, 
because they often paid above sectoral norms and had elements of ‘sophisticated human 
resource management’20.  
 
      Despite apparent consensus amongst government, IBEC and ICTU, academic 
commentary on IRAA 2001-4 was circumspect. In a critical commentary, D’Art and Turner21 
(2003) argued that the legislation was ineffective because it excluded provisions for statutory 
recognition for collective bargaining purposes and by virtue of this, excluded unions from the 
workplace, and legitimised companies’ non-union status. Their empirical support for the 
legislation’s ineffectiveness was drawn from 39 cases processed under the voluntary leg of 
IRAA 2001, as of December 2001. The conclusion of this work, stemming from the 
                                                     
18 Roche, above n.6 
19 P. Teague and J. Donaghey, J. ‘Why has Irish social partnership survived?’, (2009) 47 British Journal of Industrial 
Relations, 55 
20 W.K. Roche and J. Geary, J. ‘Collaborative production and the Irish boom: work organisation, partnership and direct 
involvement in Irish workplaces’, (2000) 31 Economic and Social Review, 1 
21 D. D’Art and Turner, above n.2 
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observation that only one case out of 39 had resulted in union recognition in the first year of 
the legislation, seems premature in stating that “these initial outcomes would appear to 
characterise the Act as a dismal failure”22. Furthermore, these authors largely benchmarked 
IRAA 2001-4 on its capacity to deliver union recognition. Given that recognition was not part 
of the remit of IRAA 2001-4, it seems incongruous to describe it as failing on a standard it 
was not meant to deliver. A later study, based on a survey of union officials, found that the 
majority (54 per cent of officials surveyed) regarded IRAA 2001 as “not effective”, citing 
rising employer hostility to union recognition23. Yet here respondents were asked the extent 
to which IRAA 2001 was a “route to recognition”. Nor is it addressed that even in this 
context, nearly 40 per cent of officials found the legal provisions of IRAA 2001 “sometimes 
effective”. Notably the evidence in both articles dates from before the 2004 amendments to 
the original IRAA 2001 were made, were therefore early in the life-time of IRAA 2001-4 and 
at a point when there were recognised teething problems relating to employer delaying 
tactics. Notably a less hostile, but briefer, commentary is offered by Roche24. Reviewing the 
broader trajectory of unionisation and membership since the mid-1990s, Roche submitted that 
the contribution of the IRAA 2001-4 in this context was probably conducive to union 
organising. However, in the midst of a broader array of structural, institutional and cyclical 
influences uncongenial to union growth, the overall impact of IRAA 2001-4 in raising 
membership density was considered to be, at best, modest.  
 
      It remains the case however that a more comprehensive, up-to-date assessment of the 
IRAA 2001-4 is warranted, albeit marked by the caveat that in 2007 the procedures were 
thrown into disarray after a successful legal challenge by the non-union airline Ryanair 
(discussed below). Since 2007, the legislation has remained in limbo, although the present 
                                                     
22 D’Art, and Turner, above n.2 at 234 
23 D’Art and Turner, above n.2 at 121 
24 Roche, above n.6 
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coalition government has promised to make appropriate amendments to restore it. Below, the 
next two sections are concerned with the efficacy of IRAA 2001-2004 in assisting the 
representation of union members in firms where collective bargaining was absent. In section 
4, the results of empirical investigation of cases under the IRAA 2001-4 are detailed to 
provide a more complete picture of how the provisions operated in practice. Before doing 
this, Section 3 outlines the data collection methods. 
 
3. Research methods 
The data is based on empirical evidence gathered between 2005 and 2007. The data presented 
here is based on the known disputes under IRAA 2001-4 as registered by the Labour Court. 
Data collection was conducted in two ways: First, in 2005, an initial analysis of all existing 
IRAA 2001-4 disputes up to the end of 2005 was completed by one of the authors25 
(Dobbins, 2005). This involved collating, on an on-going basis, a database of every 
recommendation and determination relating to disputes under the legislation. It also entailed 
making telephone calls to company human resource managers and union officials 
representative of each organisation involved in these disputes for further 
information/interview. Second, a series of more detailed fieldwork cases were then conducted 
between 2006 and 2007 of 15 disputes under IRAA 2001-4. These disputes were drawn from 
the known population of cases to have gone through the procedures and were selected on 
grounds of access to key informants. The disputes were typically registered at the Labour 
Court between 2004 and 2007 (see Table 8 below).  
 
      Data collection in the 15 cases relied on face-to-face interviews, usually of one hour 
duration. The first data source was the company chief executive who either owned or headed 
                                                     
25 T. Dobbins ‘The impact of the 2001-2004 Industrial Relations Acts’, Industrial Relations News (Dublin 2005, 47) 
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the firms participating in the case studies. Interviews were also conducted with full-time trade 
union organisers responsible for the individual dispute, and documentary analysis was 
collated of specific employer responses to the recognition request. Whilst the enquiry sought 
to interview the relevant union officials for all fifteen firms, this proved impossible and union 
officials were found to be frequently either un-contactable and/or unwilling to participate. 
Eight union organisers, representing workers involved in twelve disputes, were interviewed. 
Interviews covered the origins, practice and outcomes of disputes. Background interviews 
were also conducted with representatives from the ICTU, IBEC, LRC and Labour Court. A 
limitation of the case studies is lack of information about union members within each firm, a 
problem resulting from issues of access and confidentiality. While confinement of case 
selection to availability of access is less than ideal, the reliance on access for selection is 
reasonable where an enquiry seeks to study what can often be difficult to reach or contentious 
types of cases26. Our own analysis, and interviews with union officials, tends to indicate that 
the actions of included case firms were broadly typical of employer behaviour in disputes 
processed under the procedures.  
 
4. Background on IRAA 2001-4 disputes 
First it is appropriate to outline the IRAA 2001-4 dispute population through each distinct 
stage of the procedures. Failure to resolve disputes at local-level in the first instance resulted 
in matters being referred to the LRC. Such cases, until mid-2004, were advanced under SI 
145. The 2004 reforms, resulting in the aforementioned shortening of timescales, led to a 
switchover to SI 76. Table 1 and 2 detail the number of cases referred to the LRC under these 
codes from 2001 until 2012.  
 
                                                     
26 W.L. Neuman, Social Research Methods, (Allyn and Bacon 1997) 
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TABLE 1 
TABLE 2 
 
      The ‘switchover’ to SI 76 was reported by unions to be faster in processing of dispute 
claims. Subsequently under SI 76 there is much higher utilisation between 2004 and 2006, 
before a sharp decline due to the 2007 Supreme Court judgement (discussed below). Aside 
from 2005, where the LRC27 collated and disseminated detailed figures, there are no known 
records of the number of cases fully resolved at this level. In 2005 the LRC reported that 146 
cases had been advanced under SI 76, only 75 had been ‘completed’ at LRC level: 
‘completed’ being inclusive of cases where all issues were resolved at the LRC, where issues 
were referred to the Labour Court or where collective bargaining was negotiated. Only 25 of 
these had all issues resolved at LRC level with 60 cases being referred to the Labour Court. 
In just six cases was collective bargaining negotiated. Further interviews with the LRC 
suggest that patterns reported in this period are representative of year on year trends. 
 
      However despite the high number of cases referred by the LRC, the number of cases 
addressed by the Labour Court remains smaller. Table 3 details the number of Labour Court 
recommendations and Table 4 the number of subsequent determinations: 
TABLE 3 
TABLE 4 
      There were 109 recommendations and 28 determinations by the Labour Court. There was 
a considerable increase in cases from 2004 to 2006 due to the 2004 amendment, which 
speeded up the process of referring cases to the Court. From 2007 onwards, the sharp 
downward trend (evident with SI 76) is also evident. Determinations in the early life of the 
                                                     
27 Labour Relations Commission, Annual Report (2005) 
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procedures remained low, with a relative surge in 2005 before tailing off again. Various 
reasons exist for the disjuncture between the number of LRC cases, the numbers referred to 
the Labour Court and those actually heard by the Court. Disputes registered at the LRC were 
often withdrawn by unions on the grounds that support for pursuing issues at local-level had 
withered away or employers had indicated willingness to discuss disputed issues (the former 
scenario was claimed by unions to be more typical). Particularly with SI 145, unions would 
subsequently withdraw from procedures because of dissatisfaction with the length of the 
process or because support for the campaign at local-level had ebbed away. Some unions, 
post-LRC stage, opted to take cases under the aforementioned IRA 1969 on the perception 
that it was less convoluted or union’s claims on individual terms and conditions might not 
hold under IRAA 2001-4. Furthermore, the smaller number of determinations should not be 
taken as evidence that recommendations were fully complied with. Unions reported that in 
many cases, employers did not necessarily follow the initial recommendation, but could 
frequently ‘cut a deal’ to satisfy employees at local-level that was influenced by, but not 
directly mapped to, the Labour Court ruling.  
 
      In terms of deployment (see Table 5), IRAA 2001-4 was used mostly in the indigenous 
services sector (close to two-thirds of cases). Retail, security, hoteliers, transport, crèches, 
nursing homes and waste-management firms were typical targets. These were characterised 
by one union official as “low hanging fruit”. In manufacturing, the pharmaceutical/medical 
devices sector, packaging, and industries supplying to the then booming Irish construction 
industry were targeted. In terms of ownership, close to 80 percent of firms subject to IRAA 
2001-4 were Irish-owned, with a minority from the US, Europe and UK respectively. An 
even spread of small- to medium-sized enterprises (measured by number of employees) were 
subject to IRAA 2001-4, with large firms in the minority. There are a lower number of 
17 
 
employers relative to the overall number of recommendations and determinations as some 
employers could be subject to more than one recommendation and/or a recommendation and 
determination. 
 
TABLE 5 
 
      As Table 6 demonstrates, the number of private sector employees subject to Court 
recommendations/determinations was low vis-à-vis the overall private sector labour force, 
which at the first quarter of 2008, was recorded at 1,350,30028. This would tend to support 
Roche’s29 claim that the direct effects of the procedures on union recruitment and density 
were likely to have been quite modest. 
TABLE 6 
 
5. IRAA 2001-4 in practice 
A. Preliminary overview of cases 
At the end of 2005, an analysis of Labour Court decisions on cases taken under IRAA 2001-4 
was completed. Between March 2002 and December 2005, the Labour Court was found to 
have issued 56 full recommendations and 17 binding determinations on disputes over union 
representation under the Act, a total of 73 decisions as of the end of 2005. Recommendations 
are reviewed here, as determinations simply reinforced or clarified existing recommendations 
in particular cases. Table 7 summarises the outcomes of the 56 Labour Court 
recommendations under IRAA 2001-4, as to whether union claims were fully supported, 
partially supported or rejected. 
 
                                                     
28 <www.cso.ie> 
29 Roche, above n.6 
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TABLE 7 
      The evidence suggests that unions were generally successful in using the Act to secure 
pay and conditions improvements in non-union companies; albeit with limits to 
achievements. Our review of union claims and Court recommendations indicates that 24 out 
of 56 (43%) received full support from the Labour Court. Fifteen (27%) received partial 
support insofar as some elements of the union claim were rejected, whilst 17 (30%) were 
rejected in their entirety. The vast majority of the 56 Labour Court recommendations affected 
relatively small non-union indigenous firms with less than 50 workers. Only a handful of 
cases involved large firms and multinationals. Moreover, in cases involving large firms, 
unions found it difficult to secure Court support. For instance, in the cases of two US firms, a 
software manufacturer30and pharmaceutical manufacturer31, the Court rejected the unions’ 
pay claims, concluding that pay rates were not out of line with norms elsewhere. Where pay 
and employment conditions were deemed to measure up to industry norms, it seemed difficult 
to subject multinationals to claims under the legislation. One notable exception involved a 
large US multinational32, where the Court awarded enhanced redundancy pay to 100 staff set 
to lose their jobs due to outsourcing of a call centre.  
 
      In the other cases involving small- and medium-sized firms, the Court mostly backed 
union claims, often instructing employers to concede substantial pay rises, albeit frequently 
from a low base. In this regard, unions were able to secure some concrete gains for members, 
especially after the ‘fast tracking’ of cases that took effect in 2004. Although the Court was 
precluded from directly instructing non-union employers to engage in collective bargaining, 
in many cases it ‘shadowed’ collective bargaining by imposing similar outcomes in non-
union firms to those found in comparator employments in the unionised sector. That is, the 
                                                     
30 LCR18137 Analog Devices/SIPTU 
31 LCR18013 Amershan Health/SIPTU 
32 LCR18344 United Airlines/CWU 
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Court benchmarked pay levels in private sector non-union firms (where there was a pay claim 
by union members) with pay norms applying in unionised firms with collective bargaining, 
usually in the same/similar industries, and subsequently bringing pay levels into some kind of 
comparative equilibrium. In some cases33, the Court imposed a standard 39 hour working 
week, the collective norm in many unionised workplaces. Also, the Court instructed some 
non-union firms to facilitate representation, grievance and dispute resolution rights for union 
members. For example, in one decision34, the Court declared that an internal grievance 
procedure was not appropriate for dealing with collective disputes. It was noted that internal 
procedures were not suitable because they expressly provided for individual grievances only 
and were not normally used by the parties. In short, a form of ‘shadow collective bargaining’ 
was occurring, whereby the Court had powers to regulate minimum pay norms, employment 
conditions and dispute procedures in non-union firms that were standard in unionised firms. 
In a number of cases35, the Court went even further by making payment of national wage 
deals compulsory for union members, by not only instructing non-union firms to pay existing 
national wage agreements, but also instructing some employers to pay national wage terms 
into the future when they fell due.  
 
B. Case studies of 15 disputes 
Whilst this preceding overview of disputes under IRAA 2001-4 indicates broadly favourable 
outcomes for unions and their members, a more nuanced picture emerges when 15 selected 
cases were examined in more qualitative detail during 2006 and 2007. Table 8 summarises 
the 15 employers who comprised the fieldwork cases by the year the dispute was first 
registered at the Labour Court, firm size, sector and national ownership. 
 
                                                     
33 LCR18184 Ormonde Waste/SIPTU 
34 LCR17919 Radio Kerry/Mandate 
35 LCR17908 Cooley Distillery/SIPTU 
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TABLE 8 
      In terms of outcomes across the 15 cases, the opening employer response to union 
requests to enter negotiations was typically met by a refusal to engage at workplace level. 
Union requests to discuss issues at local-level were either ignored by employers or met with 
responses that direct relations with individual employees were favoured (see Table 9). In 
eight cases, employers called, what union officials termed, “captured audience meetings” 
outlining their disappointment and hostility that unions were attempting to organise the 
workplace. Just one employer met with the union, but notwithstanding this, no agreement 
could be secured. The lack of progress at workplace level led to cases being brought by 
unions to the LRC. Yet efforts by the LRC to encourage voluntary resolution were largely 
fruitless. In some instances, employers did not appear at the LRC, responding to invites by 
claiming union unrepresentativeness or that disputed issues were being, or had been, 
addressed internally. One employer, for instance, refused to entertain an LRC meeting on the 
grounds that it would provide “de facto recognition” of the union’s legitimacy and dent the 
company’s “principled position of non-unionism” (Employer, WasteCo). However some 
employers were more receptive to LRC invitations, attending on the grounds that “it was 
worth exploring the substance of the union’s claim, but in an environment where we wouldn’t 
directly enter negotiations with them, but explore it through the [LRC] Advisory people” 
(Employer, DrinksCo). In these cases, employers declared inability to pay union requests for 
wage increases, but nonetheless indicated some readiness to resolve disputed issues. In only 
three cases was substantial progress made on resolving issues in dispute. 
 
TABLE 9 
 
 
      Of the 15 disputes, no full resolutions of disputes were secured at the voluntarist LRC 
stage, resulting in cases being advanced to the Labour Court. In general, employers attended 
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the Labour Court hearing given the potential for a recommendation (and subsequent 
determination) being issued against them (see Table 10). As one employer put it:  
 
The advice we received was that Court intervention might have legal implications for 
the company down the line and affect our ability to match terms and conditions with 
the market. So naturally, we felt compelled to attend and defend our position.  
(Employer, GlassCo) 
 
      However a characteristic approach was to undermine the legitimacy of the union claim or 
create obstacles to Labour Court intervention. For example, one employer argued that the 
Court hearing was “illegitimate”, claiming the union had none of the company’s employees 
in membership (Employer, CementCo). The union offered the Court a list of members on a 
confidential basis, suggesting that employees feared hostility from the company if 
membership was known. The union cited separate instances of union victimisation. 
CementCo solicitors objected to this, arguing that their client was entitled, on the grounds of 
natural justice and fair procedure, to comment on material placed before the Court. On this 
basis, the solicitors argued, the case should be dropped. The Court refused to receive such 
information from the union, but, crucially, observed that the IRAA 2001-4 did not require a 
minimum number of members to process a case and accepted union assurances that it was 
representative of employees. 
 
      Other employers were less hostile and partial compromise was offered. In the PlasticsCo 
case, the employer stated that whilst it would not recognise the union for collective 
bargaining purposes, it would meet some union requests (in this case, improved sick pay). At 
GlassCo, agreement was reached with the union on fixed pay scales and a sick pay scheme, 
along with assurances on a pension scheme. Nonetheless unions did suffer occasional defeat. 
In the PetrolCo case, the Court found that the employer paid workers the going rate for the 
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sector and that the union pay claim was invalid (the union could not prove pay rates were out 
of line). In the WasteCo dispute, the employer successfully argued that pay exceeded sectoral 
norms, citing Central Statistics Office (CSO) earnings surveys in support. Similar outcomes 
were replicated at EngineeringCo and TelecomCo, although in the former the employer was 
advised to establish procedures allowing union representation on individual matters. 
TABLE 10 
      Table 11 outlines Labour Court recommendations in the 15 cases. Consistent with our 
preliminary analysis of 56 recommendations, it finds that unions were often successful in 
securing Labour Court recommendation in pursuit of claims, despite some defeats or partial 
defeats. In a number of the disputes, notably CementCo, DrinksCo, GlassCo, MedicalCo, 
PackagingCo, PharmaCo, PrintCo, SupplyCo and TabletCo increases in basic pay and 
adherence to national wage agreements were recommended. The Court typically 
recommended that employees be granted rights to union representation for individual 
grievance and disciplinary matters. 
 
TABLE 11 
      Unsurprisingly, some employers displayed hostility towards the Labour Court in light of 
their experience under IRAA 2001-4. Court influence was an “infringement on the rights of 
business” (DrinksCo), diluted with “anti-business sentiment” (PackagingCo), “biased towards 
union style industrial relations” (SupplyCo) or even “totalitarian” in its provisions 
(PlasticsCo). Of particular concern amongst those employers subject to IRAA 2001-4 was the 
lack of criteria for union representativeness and subsequent ‘ease’ at which the union could 
secure a Court hearing. Many saw this as providing “a blank cheque for the unions” 
(CementCo), allowing unions to bring changes in the firm’s employment conditions without 
having to demonstrate the extent of their support: 
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When they were asked how many production operatives they have (in membership), 
they said ‘we have eighty’. Now that can’t be true because we don’t even have that 
many operatives in the first place. 
(Employer, PharmaCo) 
 
      In the aftermath of Labour Court recommendations, different outcomes emerged (Table 
12), indicating that transposition of recommendations could be problematic. Only 3 out of 15 
firms fully implemented initial recommendations – DrinksCo, GlassCo and PlasticsCo. None 
opted to formally recognise unions for collective bargaining purposes. Unions had to secure 
further binding Labour Court determinations to compel company compliance in eight 
disputes. In EngineeringCo, a determination was sought to enable the union to represent 
individual employees in grievance and disciplinary cases. At CementCo, refusal to implement 
the Court recommendation and a subsequent determination resulted in the union advancing a 
case to the Circuit Court for prosecution. However CementCo subsequently initiated High 
Court proceedings against the Labour Court determination on the grounds that it was invalid. 
In MedicalCo, TabletCo and WasteCo, the union had to bring at least two other claims on 
dispute issues for further recommendations under IRAA 2001-4. Such repeat campaigns 
however tended to undermine support amongst employees as it signalled that the employer 
would be unlikely to concede union recognition: 
 
Management, from the first to the last, they said they would never deal with a union. 
And they’re a company who deal with unions all over the world, but they said ‘we 
will never deal with a union in Ireland’. For a lot of people, if they had the chance to 
vote us in, they would have voted us in 9 to 1, but for a lot of people it was ‘why join, 
it’s going nowhere, they’ll never deal with us’. 
(Union Organiser, TabletCo) 
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      Problematically for unions, officials often reported difficulties in retaining members in 
cases where no Labour Court support for claims was forthcoming as it generated perceptions 
that union membership was of little efficacy. 
 
TABLE 12 
 
Employer legal challenges against IRAA 2001-4 procedures 
As previously noted, early 2007 saw a challenge against a Labour Court determination 
brought by the airline Ryanair to the national Supreme Court36. This derived from a long-
running dispute in the airline where, amongst other disputed issues, claims of anti-union 
discrimination and inducements to remain union-free were alleged. The Supreme Court 
appeal case emanated from the High Court refusing to reverse a Labour Court determination 
against the company37. At the Supreme Court, Ryanair advanced that there was no trade 
dispute, that internal dispute resolution procedures had not been exhausted in the first 
instance and that the company already provided for internal collective bargaining. Ryanair 
maintained the existence of collective bargaining because it held it negotiated with 
representatives of employees in concluding collective agreements on terms and conditions of 
employment. Ryanair further maintained to have an Employee Representative Committee 
whereby elected employee representatives negotiated with the employer (a fact contested by 
the union, IMPACT, which claimed the body was a consultative forum with no 
independence).  In light of the available evidence however, the Supreme Court struck out the 
Labour Court determination. The Supreme Court found that, in the absence of sufficient 
evidence, the Labour Court could not conclude that the Employee Representative Committee 
was not a collective bargaining body; that a collective bargaining unit need not be a trade 
union or excepted body with a negotiating license, but could be a body established by an 
                                                     
36 Ryanair v The Labour Court, [2007] 377/05 
37 DECP051 Ryanair/IMPACT/IAPA 
25 
 
employer provided it exhibited an element of ‘independence’, had a system of elections and 
operated in a ‘fair and reasonable’ manner. The Court further stipulated that employees could 
not simply leave a ‘functioning’ internal bargaining body, not exhaust its procedures for 
dispute resolution and then say they had no collective bargaining in place, thereby triggering 
the IRAA 2001-4 provisions; adding that if the Labour Court did have jurisdiction to 
investigate the case, it should consider the dispute through gathered evidence, referring to 
lack of sufficient union membership evidence. 
 
      Subsequent to the Supreme Court judgement, two of the case study employers attempted 
to exploit the ruling. As the employer PharmaCo acknowledged:  
 
The Supreme Court ruling crystallised all of our concerns about the Act. It opened the 
space for us to challenge the legality of what the Labour Court was imposing.  
 
      At the Supreme Court, PharmaCo registered an appeal against the Labour Court 
determination, claiming that the Labour Court was ‘misdirected’ in determining the existence 
of a dispute by accepting “unsubstantiated assertions” from the union. In retort, the union 
balloted for industrial action, but refrained from strike action when the employer evinced a 
desire to resolve matters at workplace level. An agreement on pay and conditions was drawn 
up, made without reference to the Labour Court determination, but providing for a similar 
outcome. At the same time, the employer instituted an internal employee forum to act as a 
‘collective bargaining’ body. In the PackagingCo case, when the union sought a Labour 
Court determination in early 2007 the employer claimed the hearing was invalid as it already 
engaged in collective bargaining through a ‘Employee Representative Council’, and raised 
several issues relating to verification of union members, use of internal procedures and 
existence of a ‘trade dispute’. However, the Court noted that at the original recommendation 
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hearing, the employer had raised no qualms on the existence of a dispute nor claimed to 
engage in collective bargaining. The Court subsequently issued a determination, which the 
employer later complied with. 
 
      As evident from Table 1, within months of the 2007 Supreme Court judgment, the 
number of cases taken by unions dissipated significantly. Between 2008 and 2012, there were 
just 4 cases under IRAA 2001-4. Two factors explain this outcome: first, the consequence of 
the Supreme Court judgment was to impose arduous standards on unions for securing a 
Labour Court hearing and second, with the legitimacy afforded to employer sponsored 
internal bargaining units it was now easier for employers to evade IRAA 2001-4 applications. 
From 2007, ensuing cases often lacked the perceived requirements for a legitimate Labour 
Court adjudication and were thereby rejected. Consequently, Irish unions refrained from 
further use of the legislation, hoping for a resolution of the impasse through national social 
partnership. Whilst the national partnership agreement of September 2008 affirmed that a 
review body would investigate the problem, subsequent breakdown of social partnership in 
2009, over disagreements in fiscal policy and public sector wage reductions, put a halt to 
such considerations. 
 
6. Discussion and conclusion 
The article has provided an up-to-date assessment in the usage and impact of the IRAA 2001-
4 procedures. Prior to the Supreme Court ruling, utilisation of the procedures across both 
‘voluntary’ and statutory ‘fall back’ stages evidenced, for the most part, progressive growth, 
although its incursion into the non-union sector remained modest. Dispute settlement at LRC 
stage was low. Labour Court recommendations, targeted primarily at small- to medium-sized 
indigenous employers, were predominately supportive of union claims. However, the Court 
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rejected a significant minority of claims. Where Court support was forthcoming, significant 
gains in terms and conditions could accrue for union members. Aside from one year (2005), 
issuing of determinations relative to the number of recommendations, remained low. Beyond 
these trends, a series of empirical cases detailing employer behaviour across the gamut of 
IRAA 2001-4 processes, both before and after the Supreme Court ruling, were examined in 
more depth. This revealed a strong employer aversion to initially settling disputes locally and 
voluntary resolution at LRC stage was also limited. Where union claims were supported at 
the Labour Court, employer compliance was subsequently, although often partially, 
forthcoming. Yet even highly obstinate employers often perceived little choice but to yield to 
binding determinations in some form. Transposition of Court rulings were conducive to some 
settling of Labour Court terms at local-level between the employer and union, but there was 
no evidence in the specific cases that an on-going bargaining relationship was embedded or 
formal recognition conceded. In aggregate, the evidence suggests that IRAA 2001-4, prior to 
the Supreme Court ruling, was broadly successful in generating pay rises, improvements in 
employment conditions and better access to procedures for a relatively modest number of 
workers in non-unionised firms. The ‘good employer’ benchmark, as set out in successive 
Court decisions under IRAA 2001-4, provided new sick pay schemes and grievance 
procedures where previously absent. Undoubtedly, employers had to be pulled, to different 
degrees, with great reluctance through this system and securing procedural and substantive 
gains for members was not unproblematic for unions in terms of time and resources. 
 
      However, unlike a statutory recognition system, such as in the UK, the Irish policy 
approach was perhaps superior in some respects for addressing union member interests in 
firms where collective bargaining was not practiced. In contrast, statutory recognition 
procedures do not compel employers to make material concessions on employee pay and 
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conditions, which have to be subsequently determined through the free play of collective 
bargaining. In a context of obstinate employers, general union weakness at local-level and a 
requirement that employees be willing to act collectively to induce such concessions, 
securing gains for members through statutory recognition might have proved more 
challenging. As Brown et al. have observed “the mere fact that an employer has granted 
union recognition tells one little about the practical value of that to the trade union in terms of 
effective collective bargaining”38.  Indeed reviews of the UK recognition procedures indicate 
the limited scope of bargaining and that the procedures have tended to produce more 
consultative relationships than meaningful joint regulation39.  
 
      It might be maintained that ensuring effective representation of member interests 
necessitates that other levers of industrial and economic power of unions come in to play like 
high density levels and robust financial resources40. IRAA 2001-4 partly circumvented these 
kinds of problems in local-level representation. Where employers fell below general 
prevailing sectoral norms, unions could use the weight of the Labour Court to raise standards. 
This is not to suggest that benefits all fell towards unions, employers also benefitted from this 
approach. The design of the procedures was such that it largely freed employers from direct 
union involvement so long as terms and conditions of employment were not out of line with 
sectoral norms. The Irish procedures could be regarded as providing more certain outcomes 
for employers, which might not necessarily be so under a statutory recognition regime. Of 
course, there were evident disadvantages in the procedures for both parties too. That IRAA 
2001-4 was confined to resolving particular defined issues in dispute, reduced unions in some 
                                                     
38 Brown, above, n.11 at 186 
39 W. Brown and D. Nash, ‘What has been happening to collective bargaining under New Labour? Interpreting WES 2004’, 
[2008] 39 Industrial Relations Journal, 91 
40 E. Batstone,‘The frontier of control’ in D. Gallie (ed.), Employment in Britain (Blackwell 1998) 
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cases, to repeated reliance on the Labour Court where other contested matters arose. In the 
case studies, enduring employer opposition at MedicalCo, TabletCo and WasteCo resulted in 
additional dispute cases being put through the system. Where Court support for the union was 
not forthcoming, it was difficult for the union to demonstrate its value to (potential) members, 
resulting in subsequent worker disengagement. Such dynamics are evidently an encumbrance 
on union time and resources (and, indeed, on those of the LRC and Court). Union aspirations 
that use of the procedures might indirectly prompt employers towards formal recognition did 
not materialise, confirming D’Art and Turner’s early prognosis41. On the other hand, amongst 
non-union employers participating in this study, perceptions existed that the legislation was 
manipulated by ‘outside’ trade unions with the aid of state employment bodies. Perceived 
incursions on jealously guarded prerogatives may have served to heighten the employer sense 
of injustice and doggedness to remain non-union as well as explain subsequent failures to bed 
down meaningful bargaining relationships42.  
 
      Post the Supreme Court judgment, IRAA 2001-4 remains in limbo, despite the present 
coalition government, in power since 2011, promising to resolve the matter. In 2010, the 
ICTU advanced a complaint to the Committee on Freedom of Association (CFA) at the 
International Labour Organization (ILO) on the Ryanair dispute-Supreme Court ruling in a 
bid to gain support for stronger bargaining rights and prompt reform at national level. With 
reference to ILO Convention No. 98, the ICTU alleged that: Ryanair’s act of anti-union 
discrimination breached Article 1; that interference by the employer in workers’ 
organisations breached Article 2; that subsequently Article 3 was breached because Ireland 
had failed to take steps to establish machinery for the purpose of protecting the right to 
                                                     
41 D’Art  and Turner, above n.2 
42 R. Adams,‘Why statutory union recognition is bad policy: the North American experience’, [1999] 30 Industrial Relations 
Journal, 96 
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organise; that there had been a failure to promote the principle of voluntary collective 
bargaining as required by Article 4 and that Ireland was in breach of Article 4 because 
Ryanair’s ERCs could not conclude a collective agreement. In its response, the CFA noted 
that, whilst the alleged actions of Ryanair would contravene Article 2 if true, “insufficient 
evidence” existed as to whether the company offered conditional benefits to avoid a 
collective bargaining relationship with the union43. However the ICTU complaint was not 
withheld. Rather the CFA broadly recommended that, (a) the Irish Government in reviewing 
existing measures, ensure that, if required, protection be made available against anti-union 
discrimination and employer interference (as per Article 2); (b) the Government should carry 
out an independent inquiry into the Ryanair dispute to determine the veracity of the 
allegations and, if required, take required measures to ensure respect for freedom of 
association as per Article 3;  and (c) the Government, in consultation with unions and 
employers, should review the existing mechanisms available with a view to promoting 
voluntary negotiation of collective agreements between employers’ and workers’ 
organisations as per Article 4. Notably, the Irish government welcomed the ILO report, 
observing that it: 
 
“did not find Ireland to be in breach of its obligations under ILO Conventions in 
respect of collective bargaining rights. Neither did the ILO find that a resolution of 
the difficulties arising over the Ryanair judgement would require the introduction of a 
legal regime of mandatory trade union recognition”44. 
 
      Subsequently the government indicated that whilst recommendations (a) and (c) were 
accepted and indeed being addressed as a commitment in the Programme for Government, 
recommendation, (b) was rejected on the grounds that it would be constitutionally 
inappropriate to reopen the Ryanair dispute and that it was a decision for the relevant parties 
                                                     
43 International Labour Organisation, 363rd Report of the Committee on Freedom of Association (International Labour Office 
2012) 1, 228 
44 Dail Reports 603 (37814/12), 2012 September 18th. 
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to resume issues before the Labour Court. While the ILO report may have provided some 
momentum in assisting the reform process, progress has been slow as other industrial 
relations priorities in an environment of fiscal rectitude hold sway and uncertainty persists as 
to the precise details of any reforms45 (Roche et al. 2013). At time of writing, the government 
is considering legislative changes to restore IRAA 2001-4. This is likely to entail the 
tightening of a definition for collective bargaining in the legislation. That the Supreme Court 
also referred to a lack of evidence of union membership in the Ryanair dispute might suggest 
that matters of verification and evidence, at least where claims on levels of support are 
contested, will receive attention. Notwithstanding continued uncertainty over the direction of 
reform, it remains the case that IRAA 2001-4 and the contested matter of collective 
bargaining and union representation rights will continue to cast a shadow on Irish industrial 
relations for the foreseeable future.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                     
45 W.K. Roche, P. Teague, A. Coughlan and M. Fahy, Recession at Work (Routledge 2013) 
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Tables 
 
 
Table 1: Case Disputes advanced to LRC under original SI 145 (2001-2004) 
 2001 2002 2003 2004 
SI. 145 30 41 26 6 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
33 
 
Table 2: Case Disputes advanced to LRC under ‘fast-track’ SI 76 (2004 onwards) 
 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011   
SI. 76 73 78 82 25 8 10 7 7          
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Table 3: All recommendations issued by Labour Court under IRAA 2001-4  
 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 Total 
Recommendations 2 10 20 30 32 9 2 - 2 2 - 109 
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Table 4: All determinations issues by Labour Court under IRAA 2001-4 
  2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 Total 
Determinations  - 2 2 13 5 4 2 - - - - 28 
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Table 5: Characteristics of firms involved in IRAA 2001-4 cases 
 
  2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
Sector:             
 Manufacturing 1 2 
 
8 10 10 
 
3 - - - 1 - 
Services 1 7 9 15 19 4 2 - 2 1 - 
Size:             
 Small 
(10-49) 
2 3 7 16 13 4 2 0 1 - - 
Medium 
(50-249) 
- 4 8 4 13 3 - -  1 - 
Large 
(250 +) 
- 2 2 5 4 - - - 1 1 - 
Nationality             
 Irish 2 9 12 16 25 5 2 - 2 - - 
UK - - 1 1 - - - -  - - 
European - - 2 2 1 2 - -  1 - 
US - - 2 5 2 - - -  1 - 
Other - - - 1 - - - -  - - 
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Table 6: Number of employees subject to Labour Court recommendations and/or determinations 
 
 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 Total 
No. employees 
 
- 140 1354 2983 2636 3163 467 130 - 52 242 - 11,167 
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Table 7: Union success in obtaining supporting Labour Court recommendations under IRAA 2001-4 
between 2002-2005 
 
Case Labour Court support union 
claim 
Labour Court partially support 
union claim 
Labour Court reject union claim 
LCR17098  *  
LCR17236 *   
LCR17398  *  
LCR17469  *  
LCR17472 *   
LCR17607 *   
LCR17679 *   
LCR17685   * 
LCR17699   * 
LCR17745   * 
LCR17760  *  
LCR17797 *   
LCR17891  *  
LCR17897 *   
LCR17906  *  
LCR17908 *   
LCR17914 *   
LCR17919  *  
LCR17925   * 
LCR17932 *   
LCR17933 *   
LCR17939 *   
LCR17968   * 
LCR17972  *  
LCR18013   * 
LCR18016   * 
LCR18019  *  
LCR18037 *   
LCR18040 *   
LCR18072 *   
LCR18087 *   
LCR18109 *   
LCR18111 *   
LCR18117   * 
LCR18136 *   
LCR18137   * 
LCR18151   * 
LCR18184 *   
LCR18188   * 
LCR18190  *  
LCR18206   * 
LCR18207 *   
LCR18226   * 
LCR18234   * 
LCR18242   * 
LCR18265 *   
LCR18269  *  
LCR18271   * 
LCR18274  *  
LCR18280 *   
LCR18303  *  
LCR18344 *   
LCR18346  *  
LCR18387   * 
LCR18404  *  
LCR18438 *   
 24 15 17 
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Table 8: Case study disputes by year dispute registered, sector, size and ownership 
Firm Year 
Dispute 
First 
Registered 
at Labour 
Court 
Sector Size Ownership-
Nationality 
CementCo 2004 Manufacturing Medium Irish 
DrinksCo 2005 Manufacturing Medium Irish 
EngineeringCo 2004 Manufacturing Medium US 
PharmaCo 2006 Manufacturing Medium France 
FurnitureCo  2007 Manufacturing Small Irish 
GlassCo 2006 Manufacturing Medium Irish 
MedicalCo 2004 Manufacturing Medium Irish 
PackagingCo 2006 Manufacturing Medium Irish 
PetrolCo 2006 Services Small US 
PlasticsCo 2006 Manufacturing Medium Irish 
PrintCo 2003 Manufacturing Small Irish 
SupplyCo 2006 Services Large Irish 
TabletCo 2005 Manufacturing Large German 
TelecomCo 2005 Service Small Irish 
WasteCo 2005 Services Small Irish 
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Table 9: Case study employer responses at workplace and LRC level 
 
Firm Response to Union  at Local-Level Response to LRC Conciliation 
Services 
CementCo Failed to engage, alleged victimization 
of union activists 
Failed to engage 
DrinksCo Failed to engage Engaged, no agreement reached 
EngineeringCo Failed to engage Failed to engage on first request, 
engaged on second request 
PharmaCo Failed to engage Engaged, no agreement reached 
FurnitureCo Failed to engage Engaged, agreement reached 
initially but employer later failed to 
act on the terms negotiated 
GlassCo Failed to engage Engaged, agreed to put in place new 
time scales, other issues not 
resolved 
MedicalCo Failed to engage Failed to engage 
PackagingCo Failed to engage Engaged, no agreement reached 
PetrolCo Engaged Engaged, agreement on individual 
union representation in disciplinary 
and grievance cases 
PlasticsCo Failed to engage Engaged, no agreement reached 
PrintCo Failed to engage Failed to engage 
SupplyCo Failed to engage Engaged, no agreement reached 
TabletCo Failed to engage Engaged, no agreement reached 
TelecomCo Failed to engage Failed to engage 
WasteCo Failed to engage Failed to engage 
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Table 10: Case study employer responses at Labour Court level 
Firm Employer response to Labour Court Hearing 
CementCo Engaged, claimed hearing was illegitimate as no 
employees in union membership 
DrinksCo Engaged, argued against union pay claim and claimed 
union unrepresentative of employees 
EngineeringCo Engaged, claimed hearing invalid as union raised issues 
already resolved internally 
PharmaCo Engaged,  claimed hearing invalid as union pay claims 
were not in line with industry norms and union 
unrepresentative of employees 
FurnitureCo Failed to engage 
GlassCo Engaged, acknowledged agreement reached with union 
on sick pay and future review of pensions scheme 
MedicalCo Engaged, claimed union unrepresentative of employees 
PackagingCo Engaged, acknowledged willingness to raise basic pay, 
shift premiums and overtime rates in response to union 
request, although no agreement on precise increase. 
PetrolCo Engaged,  claimed union claims on pay were not in line 
with industry norms 
PlasticsCo Engaged, acknowledged to Court agreement to changes 
on sick pay 
PrintCo Engaged, claim Court hearing illegitimate as based on 
evidence stolen from company by the union and union 
unrepresentative 
SupplyCo Engaged, claimed union claims on pay were not in line 
with industry norms 
TabletCo Engaged, claimed union claims on pay were not in line 
with industry norms 
TelecomCo Engaged, claimed union unrepresentative of employees 
WasteCo Engaged, claimed hearing was illegitimate as union 
claims on pay were not in line with industry norms 
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Table 11: Case study Labour Court recommendations 
Firm Labour Court Recommendation 
CementCo Improve pay to €13 euro per hour, plus other improvements 
DrinksCo Pay increases sought by union should be conceded; company told to follow national wage 
increases going forward 
EngineeringCo Union claims on pay rejected as rates not out of line, but company told to provide for union 
representation in individual disciplinary and grievance cases 
PharmaCo Increase pay in line with industry norms; introduce basic rate for job 
FurnitureCo 
 
Company should increase pay in line with national wage agreements 
GlassCo Union claims on pay accepted; pay rates to be increased in line with national wage 
agreements; claim for formal recognition of union rejected 
MedicalCo Increase pay based on industry norms; pay increases thereafter should follow national wage 
agreements 
PackagingCo Company told to grant national pay increases; overtime should be paid at the rate of time 
plus one half for all weekday hours; double time for Saturday and Sunday 
PetrolCo Union claims on pay rejected as rates not out of line 
PlasticsCo Introduce sick pay scheme providing for 4 weeks full pay – with no payment for first three 
days 
PrintCo Firm told to grant national pay increases, but claim for formal recognition of union rejected 
SupplyCo Pay out of line with industry norms and to be increased in line with national wage 
agreements 
TabletCo Union claims for increased pay supported and major increase in sick pay backed; claims 
over shift patterns rejected, but individual hardship cases on shift patterns to be looked at 
case by case 
TelecomCo Claims should instead be referred to new company grievance procedure 
WasteCo Company should introduce sick pay scheme; shorter working week; rejects union pay 
claims as pay not out of line 
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Table 12: Case study outcomes of disputes 
 
Firm Outcomes of Dispute  
CementCo Failed to comply with recommendation and 
determination, initiated legal challenge against Labour 
Court determination, later dropped in light of Supreme 
Court Ruling in 2007. 
DrinksCo Complied with recommendation 
EngineeringCo Failed to comply with recommendation, complied with 
subsequent determination 
PharmaCo Failed to comply with recommendation and 
determination, initiated legal challenge against Labour 
Court determination, later dropped in favour of once-off 
agreement on disputed issues with union at local-level 
FurnitureCo Complied with some elements of original 
recommendation but disputed pointed of back pay, later 
resolved at local-level 
GlassCo Complied with recommendation 
MedicalCo Failed to comply with recommendation, alleged 
victimization of union activists, further determination 
complied with 
PackagingCo Failed to comply with recommendation and 
determination, initiated legal proceedings against Labour 
Court determination, although later dropped by Company 
PetrolCo Entered once off agreement with union through further 
LRC intervention 
PlasticsCo Complied with recommendation 
PrintCo Failed to comply with recommendation, further 
determination complied with 
SupplyCo Failed to comply with recommendation, emergence of 
company redundancies negated organizing campaign 
TabletCo Failed to comply with recommendation, but complied 
with later determination 
TelecomCo Local-level resolution between union and employer on 
union rights to represent individuals in individual cases 
WasteCo Failed to comply with recommendation, complied with 
later determination 
 
 
